Fee-Based Spam Prevention For Lightning

The correspondence delves into the mechanics of mitigating jamming attacks within payment channels, specifically addressing the misconception that an amount equal to the channel's capacity needs to be locked up as collateral. It clarifies that the required stake for Upfront and Hold fees is solely the maximum amount of these fees for the current outstanding Hashed Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs), plus a fixed fraction in matching funds. This fixed fraction is determined based on the maximum potential Upfront and Hold fees, not the channel's overall capacity, demonstrating a more efficient approach than previously suggested.

The discussion further explores the behavioral dynamics influencing the resistance against losing one’s own funds, referencing the ultimatum game to illustrate situations where individuals may act against their financial self-interest to avoid feeling exploited. This psychological insight underpins strategies to prevent such exploitation in transactional contexts, emphasizing the importance of programmatic control to thwart potential "bullying" attacks. The mention of a related Optimal Payment Routing (OPR) paper suggests that leveraging automated protocols can effectively safeguard users from being disadvantaged during transactions.

Lastly, the writer acknowledges the value of providing a numeric example to better illustrate these concepts and commits to developing one. This gesture indicates an ongoing effort to enhance understanding of the proposed mitigation strategies through concrete illustrations, potentially aiding in the broader comprehension and application of these principles within the community.