Apr 11 - Apr 11, 2024
Specifically, it outlines how a miner is capable of draining the vault during the 'trigger withdrawal' transaction. This is achieved by positioning their input as the first input and the covenant-locked input as the second. The transaction is constructed in such a way that the output directed back to the miner equals the amount they initially contributed (satisfying the input_0=output_0
condition), while the remaining portion of the covenant's funds are split. A minimal amount, referred to as the "dust" amount of 546 satoshis for non-SegWit transactions, is allocated to one output, and the rest is taken as a fee by the miner, effectively allowing them to capture all the value from the vault.
Additionally, the email highlights a potential risk posed by non-miners who, although unable to directly benefit in the same manner, can nonetheless initiate transactions that result in the vault's funds being inadvertently directed to a random miner, thereby sabotaging the vault. This aspect underscores a broader security concern within the system - the lack of a safeguard against malicious interventions aimed at depleting the vault's assets without direct financial gain to the aggressor.
The author also notes a discrepancy in the minimum dust threshold between non-SegWit and SegWit transactions, with the latter having a lower threshold as determined by the IsDust()
function. This detail suggests further complexity in managing and securing transactions across different Bitcoin transaction formats.
However, the email concludes without offering a solution to this vulnerability, indicating an ongoing uncertainty or challenge in addressing this specific security flaw within the described transaction system.
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