Removing channel reserve for mobile wallet users

In the email, the sender discusses the process of public attribution in the context of a wallet user proving that the wallet provider broadcast an old state. The sender highlights four points that can be used for proof:

1. A revocation occurred: The user can point to the funding transaction output (txo) and the mined commitment transaction being spent via a revocation path.
2. The user was one of the participants: This can be proven by signing with one of the multisig funding keys.
3. The other participant (nodeid) was the provider P:
   • If it was a public channel, the user can show the channel_announcement message.
   • If it was an unannounced channel, the user most likely has a channel_update message for the incoming edge, signed by P. However, this is not guaranteed according to bolt-07.
4. Identifying the cheating counterparty: The user can sign a message with the revocationpubkey visible onchain, which was used to spend from the old state. Additionally, the user could prove ownership of the txo created by the revocation, making point 2 redundant.

The key insight mentioned is related to point 3/b, where the private channel_update can be shown. This information is crucial for creating invoices.