Hashed keys are actually fully quantum secure

The discussion revolves around the comparison of two conceptual schemes aimed at enhancing security within blockchain transactions. The first scheme assumes that increasing the number of blocks required for transaction confirmation can deter censorship profitably because miners would lose out on fees by not including certain transactions. This approach suggests that an attacker would need to distribute rewards among multiple miners, making it less feasible compared to a user who only needs to outbid the attacker once. However, this idea acknowledges a more sophisticated scheme discussed in another conversation, which appears to offer enhanced security by effectively mitigating the risk of transaction censorship regardless of the number of blocks involved.

Moreover, an alternative mechanism was considered, allowing users to commit to transactions early while retaining the flexibility to wait for an unspecified duration before finalizing. This method includes a feature to alert users if someone attempts to spend the committed amount, enabling them to respond promptly. Despite its merits, it is recognized that this approach might not be as robust as the one with a unique decommitment process, which is advocated for implementation over the original proposal.

In conclusion, while acknowledging the potential limitations of the initially suggested idea, the emphasis is placed on the feasibility of delaying the integration of a QR (quick response) system into the blockchain infrastructure. The argument is made on the premise that even less optimal solutions could still substantially contribute to addressing the challenge of transaction censorship within the blockchain. This perspective invites further consideration of when and how to incorporate more advanced security measures, suggesting that there might be more leeway than initially assumed.