Against Allowing Quantum Recovery of Bitcoin

The discussion emphasizes the strategic importance of integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into current cryptographic practices, specifically within the Bitcoin development community. The conversation, initiated by Jameson Lopp, revolves around the necessity of adopting PQC mechanisms sooner rather than later to ensure future security and flexibility in the face of potential threats posed by quantum computing advancements. A key point raised is the recommendation to incorporate a simple form of PQC, such as OP_HASHBASEDSIG (presumably SPHINCS+), into tapscript. This approach would allow for the embedding of PQC public keys in wallet outputs, including those configured for multisignature setups, hidden within taptrees.

The rationale behind this early adoption is twofold. Firstly, it provides a significant safety margin against the eventual capability of quantum computers to break current cryptographic schemes. Secondly, it maintains the optionality for future actions that may require the seizure of non-PQC secured coins, without necessitating immediate decisions on such measures. The timeline suggested for this implementation indicates a proactive strategy, recommending that wallets should start incorporating PQC public keys at least a decade before any potential enforcement action, highlighting the urgency and forward-thinking needed in the development community to safeguard digital assets against quantum vulnerabilities.