Weak Quantum Bounty Ceremony

Exploring the potential interactions between quantum adversaries and cryptographic systems, an intriguing method is proposed that leverages inherent capabilities of such adversaries to authenticate their prowess without necessitating Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols. Specifically, a scenario is described where a quantum adversary could be challenged to compute the discrete logarithm of a point on a cryptographic curve. This computation involves a scalar ( k ) and a preimage ( x ), with verification following the equation ( K = k*G = HashToCurve(x) ). This approach simplifies the interaction by eliminating the need for complex ZK machinery commonly used in these contexts.

However, the proposal also acknowledges the risk of collision attacks where a classical prover might find a collision across all ( (x, k) ) pairs, particularly on a 160-bit curve. To mitigate this, it is suggested to fix ( x ) as a constant within the proof system, thereby reducing the feasibility of such attacks. This entire process would occur off-chain, thus avoiding complications involving Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) or Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs).

In situations where a quantum adversary demands compensation for providing such cryptographic proofs, Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payments (ZKCPs) are recommended as a viable solution. The discussion reflects skepticism regarding the practicality of such demands from quantum adversaries, suggesting instead that a self-interested quantum computer (QC) might prefer to wait until it can directly compromise cryptographic keys, such as those based on the secp256k1 algorithm, to misappropriate digital assets covertly.