Post-Quantum commit / reveal Fawkescoin variant as a soft fork

In a recent discussion on the Bitcoin Development Mailing List, participants delved into the intricacies of commit/reveal protocols and their potential vulnerabilities. A key concern raised pertains to the initial phase of these protocols, specifically how to embed a commitment within the blockchain without actually spending bitcoins. This issue highlights the dilemma of ensuring the commitment's presence in the blockchain necessary for its subsequent revelation and use, without the prerequisite of expending bitcoins, which seems paradoxical within the context of blockchain transactions.

Further exploration of the topic brought up the concept of the Proof of Quantum Computing (PoQC) trigger mechanism as an innovative solution. Despite its appeal, skepticism was expressed regarding its practicality in real-world scenarios, particularly against quantum attackers. The underlying assumption of the PoQC mechanism—that an honest node would pre-emptively activate a network-wide quantum computing defense soft-fork before a quantum attack occurs—was critiqued. Doubts were cast on the likelihood of an attacker choosing to trigger the network’s defenses voluntarily, thereby suggesting that while theoretically sound, the mechanism might falter when confronted with actual quantum threats.

This conversation illuminates ongoing efforts and challenges in enhancing blockchain security and resilience, especially in anticipation of quantum computing advancements. It underscores the need for robust, preemptive solutions that can safeguard digital assets against both theoretical and practical vulnerabilities.