A Post Quantum Migration Proposal

The discussion initiates with concerns over a proposal that suggests the deactivation of EC (Elliptic Curve) output types to mitigate risks associated with quantum computing. This approach, however, is viewed as problematic due to its potential to disable critical functionalities within the libsecp256k1 library, and the preemptive destruction of coins based on the anticipation of a threat that may not materialize. The definition of what constitutes a "quantum-vulnerable UTXO" (Unspent Transaction Output) forms part of this debate, questioning whether any Pay-to-PubKeyHash (P2PKH) or Pay-to-WitnessPubKeyHash (P2WPKH) outputs should be considered at risk, especially if the public key has been exposed.

Further exploration into the matter reveals a division within perspectives: one side advocates for disabling spends from outputs with known public keys as a precautionary measure against potential quantum computing threats, while the other argues against such actions due to the irreversible loss it would entail. Despite these differences, there's an acknowledgment that, should concrete evidence emerge proving that quantum computing has indeed compromised secp256k1, there might be broader consensus towards freezing transactions from known-public-key EC outputs.

The dialogue also touches upon an alternative solution involving commit/reveal schemes for addresses where the public key remains undisclosed. This method is suggested as a safer option, allowing individuals to continue transacting without exposing their funds to the speculated quantum risk. This conversation is a reflection of the ongoing deliberations within the Bitcoin development community, highlighting the complexities of preparing for theoretical attacks without undermining the current operational integrity of the cryptocurrency.