post-quantum: solution ideas to "tripwire"game-theory issues + a certificate-based rescue protocol

The concept discussed revolves around a mining strategy that includes a tripwire proof, providing a temporary difficulty advantage to miners who utilize it. This approach aims to deter potential censoring by requiring adversaries to control a significantly larger portion of the hashrate than is typical for a standard 51% attack. For instance, with a 2x mining advantage for honest miners including the tripwire, a censoring party would need to command at least double the honest miners' hashrate, effectively necessitating a 67% attack. If the advantage increases to 4x, the requirement rises to controlling four times the hashrate, approximating an 81% attack.

However, the implementation of such a strategy presents several challenges, primarily because it necessitates a hard fork. Nodes that do not upgrade would interpret the advantaged block containing the tripwire as invalid due to an unrecognized Proof of Work (PoW). This scenario would require careful planning and consensus well before the proposed fork date to ensure widespread node update and minimize disruptions similar to past emergency forks in blockchain history.

Additionally, concerns arise regarding the potential early activation of the fork by a dishonest minority, possibly influenced by corporate entities with substantial control over cryptocurrency volumes. This risk underscores the need for mechanisms to prevent premature or malicious triggering of the fork.

An alternative method proposed involves a User-Activated Soft Fork (UASF) approach, which could help avoid miner collusion by enforcing a rule wherein active nodes must reject any blockchain version that omits the tripwire proof. However, this method introduces complications for nodes performing Initial Block Download (IBD) or those that become active after being offline, as they would potentially reject valid blocks seen immediately post-tripwire.

The conversation also touches on the utility of pre-registration versus rescue protocols in the context of preparing for quantum vulnerabilities in blockchain security. While pre-registration might offer some preparatory benefits, a comprehensive rescue protocol, assuming no prior action by users before activation day (termed "Q-day"), would be more inclusive and urgently necessary.