A Post Quantum Migration Proposal

In a recent discussion on the potential vulnerabilities of Bitcoin's cryptographic mechanisms to quantum attacks, an interesting point was raised regarding the ECDSA R value, which is selected by the signer during transaction verification. This selection process opens up a possibility for quantum attackers to exploit by choosing arbitrary Post-Quantum (PQ) signature data and committing it at the time of spending. Jameson Lopp has articulated a critical issue in this context: without a prior commitment to a PQ public key within the output script, nodes in the network are unable to verify the legitimacy of transactions following the advent of a capable Quantum Computer (CRQC). This situation underscores the necessity for UTXO holders to proactively migrate their holdings to a secure format that preemptively incorporates such commitments, thereby safeguarding against potential quantum threats. This dialogue emphasizes the need for forward-thinking strategies to protect digital assets in the face of evolving quantum computing capabilities.