Re: Against Allowing Quantum Recovery of Bitcoin

The discussion centers on the importance of formulating post-quantum cryptography (PQC) secure schemes for Bitcoin transactions before considering actions like burning or freezing coins as a security measure against quantum attacks. A proposal was initially made suggesting a secure leaf that could serve as the only spending path, but further contemplation led to the preference for introducing a new address or taproot version. This approach offers several advantages. Firstly, it would allow public access to data indicating how many coins are secured by PQC schemes, aiding in making more informed decisions regarding adoption and planning. Additionally, it provides a clear distinction for users to ascertain whether their address is PQC secured.

Another benefit highlighted is the avoidance of imposing longer descriptors and unnecessary leaves on users not concerned about quantum threats, thereby not complicating their user experience. There's also an expectation that this separation would simplify the integration process for library and wallet developers by distinguishing between legacy taproot (tr) and PQC-secured taproot (pqc-tr) without confusing the script code and user interface (UI). Furthermore, adopting a new scheme eliminates the need for a transition period or a specific flag day to activate these security measures.

The conversation then shifts to the practical considerations of implementing PQC transactions, which are expected to require more space and computational resources. It suggests proceeding with caution regarding incentivizing these approaches prematurely, especially given uncertainties about the most effective method. While recognizing that significant fee discounts might become necessary once there's high confidence in a chosen approach, it also notes that enhanced security provided by PQC should be considered part of the incentive for adoption.