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SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories

SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories

Original Postby ZmnSCPxj

Posted on: October 7, 2024 18:44 UTC

The Decker-Wattenhofer relative delays introduce an extended locktime for HTLCs within the Lightning Network, influenced by the use of nSequence for timeouts in resolving the latest state.

This mechanism necessitates a minimum CLTV-delta that combines the current Decker-Wattenhofer nSequence state delay with any additional margins required for node downtime or forwarding purposes. The implementation of such delays could potentially increase the locktime periods for transactions, affecting the liquidity and operational flexibility of Lightning Service Providers (LSPs). In scenarios where transitions from one transaction tree to another are not smoothly assisted, LSPs might be compelled to close channels earlier than anticipated due to the nearing of the Decker-Wattenhofer delay to the timelock, thus increasing the urgency for LSPs to facilitate proper exits and maintain liquidity.

During the latest Lightning Network protocol development summit, discussions around commitment transaction fees led to a consensus on adopting zero-fee commitment transactions with a shared P2A output for fee-bumping, aimed at addressing the constraints of clients who may not afford their own UTXO in scenarios like the SuperScalar. However, this approach encounters limitations due to its reliance on exogenous fees and the financial capability of clients to support the transaction fees from their channel funds. An innovative solution proposed involves creating multiple commitment transactions per commitment state with varying feerates. This model is designed to remain incentive compatible by leveraging the asymmetry in Poon-Dryja commitment transactions, where the side holding the transaction pays the fees. To further refine this model, an asymmetric onchain fee scheme was suggested, distinguishing between LSP-side and client-side commitment transactions. The LSP-side transactions would utilize a P2A output allowing for external payment of onchain fees, thereby minimizing the reserve requirements for LSPs and ensuring they only need to cover security assurances for clients. Conversely, client-side transactions could come in several versions with different feerates, funded by the clients' channel funds and potentially the HTLCs they offered, thus aligning transaction costs with the clients' financial capacity within the channel.