The primary assertion is that an attacker, if in control of a majority of the network's hash rate, could exploit this vulnerability to permanently increase the frequency of block generation beyond the standard one block per 600 seconds, assuming the attack continues without interruption. This manipulation, however, does not permit an infinite acceleration of block production; instead, it allows for a consistent yet altered pace of block creation.

A significant component of the discussion revolves around the implementation of a grace period as a countermeasure against the severity of this attack. By introducing a limit on how far back the timestamp can be set between the last block of one period and the first block of the next, the impact of the timewarp attack can be mitigated. The formula provided, $\frac{2017 \cdot 600 - G}{2016}$, represents the adjusted rate of block generation under such a scheme, where (G) stands for the duration of the grace period in seconds. The choice of the number 2017 in the formula over the expected 2018 raises questions related to specific technical considerations, which the author acknowledges but does not elaborate on, mentioning a plan to conduct further simulations for clarity.

Furthermore, the text indicates an absence of a definitive stance on the broader application or enforcement of timestamp rules within blockchain protocols, aside from recommending the restriction on backward timestamp adjustments between consecutive block periods. This suggests an open area for research or policy development concerning the governance of timestamp integrity to secure blockchain networks against the timewarp attack.