V3 transaction policy for anti-pinning

He uses an example where Alice attempts to pay Zed 100,000 satoshis by sending 20 redundant overpayments of 10,000 satoshis each. In this scenario, Zed would collect the first ten parts that arrive and disregard the remaining ones. Nodes that successfully forwarded the collected parts would earn their fees, while those who handled the declined parts would miss out on potential earnings.

Todd suggests that the ability to forward payments quickly gains importance under these conditions, as nodes that can transmit payments faster are more likely to be compensated. This could lead to a significant disparity in revenue for nodes based on their latency. The delay caused by transmitting several kilobytes of musig2 partial signatures is highlighted, which at 5 milliseconds is considered substantial enough to affect node earnings.

This situation may incentivize nodes to adopt lower-latency commitment schemes such as Child Pays for Parent (CPFP), favoring single signature operations that can be processed more rapidly. Todd's analysis implies that the adoption of stuckless payment mechanisms might inadvertently favor certain network architectures, potentially leading to broader changes within the LN's operational framework.